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Abstract
Criminal network investigation involves a number of complex tasks and problems. Overall tasks include collection,
processing, and analysis of information, in which analysis is the key to successful use of information since it transforms
raw data into intelligence. Analysts have to deal with problems such as information volume and complexity which are
typically resolved with more resources. This approach together with sequential thinking introduces
compartmentalization, inhibits information sharing, and ultimately results in intelligence failure. We view analysis as
an iterative and incremental process of creative synthesis and logic-based sense-making where all stakeholders
participate and contribute. This paper presents a novel tool that supports a human-centered, target-centric model for
criminal network investigation. The developed tool provides more comprehensive support for analysis tasks than
existing tools and measures of performance indicate that the integration of synthesis and sense-making is feasible.
Introduction
Target-centric criminal network investigation involves
a number of complex knowledge management tasks
such as collection, processing, and analysis of informa-
tion. The motivation for such work is well described in
the training manual of the intelligence analysts of the
London Metropolitan Police [1]: Analysis is the key to
successful use of information; it transforms raw data into
intelligence. Without the ability to perform effective and
useful analysis, the intelligence process is reduced to a
simple storage and retrieval system for effectively unre-
lated data. Synthesis and sense-making are core anal-
ysis tasks; analysts move pieces of information around,
stop to look for patterns that can help them relate
the information pieces, add new pieces of information
and iteration after iteration an information structure
appears. Synthesizing emerging and evolving informa-
tion structures is a creative and cognitive process best
performed by humans. Making sense of synthesized infor-
mation structures (i.e., searching for patterns) is a logic-
based process where computers outperform humans as
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information volume and complexity increase. Develop-
ing useful tool support for target-centric criminal net-
work investigation requires integration of synthesis and
sense-making.
We present a novel tool for target-centric criminal net-
work investigation called CrimeFighter Investigator with
focus on core investigative processes and tasks. Crime-
Fighter Investigator is part of the CrimeFighter toolbox for
counterterrorism [2]. Besides CrimeFighter Investigator,
the toolbox consists of the Explorer tool targeted at open
source collection and processing and the Assistant tool
targeted at advanced structural analysis and visualization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In the Section ‘Criminal network investigation’, we dis-
cuss this area of security informatics research and focus
on four recurring problems. A generic process model for
human-centered, target-centric criminal network investi-
gation is proposed to embrace these problems. A list of
investigation tasks is presented to guide the development
of tool support. The Section ‘CrimeFighter Investigator’
describes how a selection of these tasks is supported by
CrimeFighter Investigator. The Section ‘Evaluation’ eval-
uates CrimeFighter Investigator, and the Section ‘Con-
clusions’ summarizes our methods, contributions, and
outlines future work.
© 2013 Petersen and Wiil; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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Criminal network investigation
Criminal network investigation involves the collec-
tion, processing, and analysis of information related
to specified targets. We use three investigation cases
to identify criminal network investigation tasks and
the challenges associated with these tasks. We propose
a generic process model for human-centered, target-
centric investigation to embrace the identified challenges.
Finally, a list of specific investigative tasks are out-
lined to guide the development of useful software tool
support.
A review and step-by-step reconstruction of three
criminal network investigation casesa emphasized the fol-
lowing challenges: Resources (e.g., [3-5]) are inherently a
challenge for criminal network investigations, for example
not enough man power to follow up on leads. Contex-
tual pressures such as time constraints, dynamism, and
changing goals are typically resolved withmore resources.
Existing evidence suggests that decision-making and
information processing abilities are often not optimal
because the informational complexity of the world
overwhelms human cognitive abilities and creates bias.
Information volume challenges (e.g., [3,6-8]) includes
information abundance and information scarcity.
If information is abundant and the resources required
to process the information are limited, potential sus-
pects might not be discovered. On the other hand,
if information is scarce, decisions might be based
on uncorroborated intelligence later proven to be
false. Information complexity (e.g., [8-10]) can be
introduced by both emerging and evolving infor-
mation or static collections of information where
much of the information is unreliable. Information
abundance or scarcity on its own does not neces-
sarily make the network information more complex.
The use of aliases, social complexity (e.g., culture
and language) and the mix of different information
types (e.g., audio, images, signals, video) are all factors
that increase the complexity of information. Infor-
mation sharing challenges (e.g., [7,11,12]) are often
the consequence of a compartmentalized intelligence
process, the culture within intelligence agencies and
the trade craft of secret intelligence itself. Several
reports have concluded that insufficient information
sharing between intelligence agencies is often a root
cause of intelligence failure. Examples include the 9/11
commission report and the UK report on whether
or not the 7/7 bombings in London could have been
prevented.
The main goal of our research is to understand crimi-
nal network investigation challenges, processes, and tasks
and develop tools to assist the people working with these
processes and tasks every day, to helpminimize the impact
of the challenges.
Investigationmodel
Based on a specific target-centric model for intelligence
analysis [12], we propose a generic process model for
human-centered, target-centric criminal network investi-
gation [13,14] in Figure 1.
The customer requests information about a specific tar-
get. The investigators search through existing information
and request information from the collectors (that may
also be investigators). Information related to the target is
acquired in disparate pieces over time. The investigators
use the acquired information to build a model of the target
(synthesis) and extract useful information from the model
(sense-making). The extracted information added to new
information coming in, results in changes to the model
(synthesis). The sense-making - synthesis cycle is contin-
ued throughout the investigation as new information is
acquired from investigation or extracted from the model.
The investigators both work individually and coopera-
tively as a team. The investigation results are disseminated
to the customer at the end of the investigation or at certain
intervals (or as requested).
Criminal network investigation is a human-centered
process. Investigators (and collectors) rely heavily on
their past experience (tacit knowledge) when conduct-
ing investigations. Hence, these processes cannot be fully
automated. The philosophy of the CrimeFighter Tool-
box is that the humans (in this case the investigators)
are in charge of the investigative tasks and the software
tools are there to support them [2]. The tools should
be controlled by the investigators and should support
the complex intellectual work (e.g., synthesis and sense-
making) to allow the investigators to reach better results
faster. CrimeFighter Investigator focuses on providing
human-centered, target-centric support for criminal net-
work investigations (acquisition, synthesis, sense-making,
Figure 1 Human-centered, target-centric criminal network
investigation model.
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and dissemination). Tool support for collection and pro-
cessing is beyond the scope of this paper: the Crime-
Fighter Explorer tool focuses on that. Tool support for
advanced structural analysis and visualization of the tar-
get model generated is also beyond the scope of this paper:
the CrimeFighter Assistant tool focuses on that.
Criminal network investigation tasks
Based on cases and observations of criminal network
investigation, contact with experienced end-users from
various communities, examination of existing process
models and existing tools for criminal network investi-
gation (e.g., [1,10,12,15-24]), and our own ideas for tool
support, we maintain a list of investigation tasks for each
of the processes: acquisition, synthesis, sense-making, and
dissemination. The task lists can be seen as wish lists of
requirements for what a tool for criminal network inves-
tigation should support; the lists serve as the basis for
our tool development efforts. The lists are not exhaustive;
we expect to uncover additional requirements for all four
processes over time.
Acquisition
Some information may be available at the beginning
of an investigation, but new information tends to drib-
ble in over time in disparate pieces of varying size and
complexity.
 Acquisition methods. Electronic information
arrives from various sources and should be easy to
insert into the investigation tool using methods such
as import, drag-and-drop, and cut-and-paste.
 Dynamic attributes are required to support
acquisition of various data sets formatted using for
example graph markup language (GraphML) or
comma separated values (CSV), which are likely to
have attributes different from those already in an
investigation.
 Attribute mapping. To support dynamic attributes
it is necessary to map attributes in the acquired
information to the investigation data model. For
example, mapping attributes to i an information
element’s visual labels.
Synthesis tasks assist investigators in enhancing their
particular criminal network model:
 Creating, editing, and deleting entities. Investigators
think in terms of people, places, objects, their
relationships and groups.
 Creating, editing, and deleting relationships.
Descriptive associations between entities help
discover similarities and ultimately solve criminal
network investigations. The impact of link (relation)
analysis on the creation of the target model is crucial.
 Re-structuring. Information structures typically
evolve and new structures emerge during the
investigation, through continuous re-structuring of
entities and their associations.
 Grouping. Investigators often group entities using
symbols like color and co-location (weak association),
or they use more encapsulating symbols like labeled
boxes (strong association).
 Collapsing and expanding information is essential
since the space available for manipulating information
is limited physically, perceptually, and cognitively.
 Brainstorming is often used during the early phases
of an investigation to get an initial overview of the
target and the investigation at hand. Brainstorming is
an example of a task that involves both synthesis and
sense-making activities. Brainstorming is often
supported by tools that allow information elements
to be organized in a hierarchical manner.
 Information types.Multimedia support is helpful
when investigators want to add known locations of
individuals to a map or link persons to different
segments within an audio file.
 Emerging attributes.New attributes are added to
entities during synthesis and when importing
network information into ongoing investigations.
Sense-making tasks assist investigators in extract-
ing useful information from the synthesized target
model:
 Retracing the steps. Investigators often retrace the
steps of their investigation to see what might have
been missed and where to direct resources in the
ongoing investigation.
 Creating hypotheses. Generating sets of alternative
hypotheses is a core task of any investigation that
involves making claims and finding supporting and
opposing evidence.
 Adaptive modeling. Representing the expected
structure of networks for pattern and missing link
detection is a proactive sense-making task. Adaptive
modeling embeds the tacit knowledge of investigators
in network models for prediction and analysis.
 Prediction. The ability to determine the presence or
absence of relationships between and groupings of
people, places, and other entity types is invaluable
when investigating a case. Prediction at different
information levels, i.e., attribute-, entity-, and
group-level is often required.
 Alias detection. Network structures may contain
duplicate or nearly duplicate entities. Alias detection
can be used to identify multiple overlapping
representations of the same real world object.
 Exploring perspectives. To reduce the cognitive
biases associated with a particular mind set, exploring
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different perspectives (views) of the information is a
key criminal network investigation task.
 Decision-making. During an investigation,
decisions have to be made such as selecting among
competing hypotheses, or where to allocate resources
on the ground.
 Social network analysis.Network centrality
measures such as degree, betweenness, closeness, and
eigenvector can provide important investigation
insights.
Dissemination tasks help investigators to formulate
their accumulated knowledge for the customer:
 Storytelling. Investigators ultimately need to ‘tell
stories’. Organizing evidence by events and source
documents are important tasks, since the alleged
story behind the evidence can then be presented.
 Report generation involves graphics, complete
reports, parts of investigations, etc. Being able to
produce reports fast is important in relation to
time-critical environments and frequent briefing
summaries, which otherwise take up too much
valuable investigation time.
CrimeFighter Investigator
CrimeFighter Investigator is based on a number of over-
all concepts (see Figure 2). At the center is a shared
information space. Spatial hypertext research has inspired
the features of the shared information space including
the support of investigation history [13]. The view con-
cept provides investigators with different perspectives on
the information in the space and provides alternative
interaction options with information (hierarchical view to
the left; spatial view at the center; algorithm output view
to the right). Finally, a structural parser assists the inves-
tigators by relating otherwise unrelated information in
different ways, either based on the entities themselves or
by applying algorithms to analyze them. In the following,
core CrimeFighter Investigator features are presented, but
unfortunately space limitations mean that details are lim-
ited and not all supported features can be presented (see
[13,14,25-27] for more details).
Acquisition support
CrimeFighter Investigator supports the import of net-
work information formatted as comma separated values.
Relations are imported as either an adjancy matrix or a
list of information element pairs for large criminal net-
works. When importing criminal network information
into investigations, it is necessary to map all network-
dependent variables of the existing data model to
attributes of the imported entities. Figure 3 shows the
entity attributes for a data set containing Person informa-
tion elements. Person entities have a label that displays
the value of a particular attribute below the graphical
abstraction of the entity (in this case, a stick man figure).
When importing data, the user is requested to select the
attribute to link to the display label by selecting and drag-
ging the attribute from a list of all the entity’s attributes
to a label reference area. In Figure 3, the attribute Short
Name is being dragged to the label reference area for
person entities.
Figure 2 CrimeFighter Investigator screenshot showing an early phase of the Daniel Pearl investigation [9,28].
Petersen and Wiil Security Informatics 2013, 2:10 Page 5 of 13
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/2/1/10
Figure 3 (semi mock-up)Mapping entity attribute to person
entity’s visual label.
Synthesis support
Synthesis of entities and their associations is done using
well-known interaction metaphors. CrimeFighter Inves-
tigator supports three first class entities: Information
elements, relations (between information elements) and
composites (for grouping information elements and/or
relations). Entities are created using a simple mouse
drag gesture within the investigation space. Once cre-
ated, delete and edit functionalities are available from
a button menu attached to the entities as shown in
Figure 2. Interactive labels provide another way to edit
entity attributes linked to entity display labels. The direc-
tion and the label of relations are both edited by clicking
the relation label. All entities are deleted using a menu
button () positioned relative to the entity. The color
of a composite can be set before and after its creation
(Figure 2, top).
Our criminal network investigation entities are first
class and therefore support continuous restructuring of
network information. When an information element with
multiple relations is deleted, the relation endpoints are
considered empty and can be moved freely in the com-
mon information space. The investigator can delete the
relation endpoints or reconnect them to other entities if
desired using a drag and drop gesture. The hierarchical
view (Figure 2, left) is used for classification by mov-
ing information elements in the hierarchically displayed
structure. Different types of composites can be used to
group information. The relation composite allows inves-
tigators to group multiple relations between two entities
(such as multiple emails or phone calls between two per-
sons) into a single visible entity (composite). Relation
composites group relations by inclusion. Another type of
composite supports collapsing and expanding. This type
of composite groups all information elements by inclu-
sion. Relations that are internal to the composite (have
both endpoints inside) are also included, while external
relations (at least one endpoint outside) are referenced.
This type of composite supports the concept of a sub-
space that allows the investigators to work in detail with a
portion of the complete network.
Sense-making support
Retracing the steps of criminal network investigations
is facilitated by a history feature. Recording investigation
history allows the investigative team to review the path or
progress of their investigation or to retrieve information
that previously had been deemed irrelevant or deleted,
but then found to have greater significance due to new
incoming information. The user interface of the investi-
gation history feature is embedded in the tool bar (see
Figure 2). Buttons allow navigation of recorded events,
and current events are visualized using a slider as well
as a label showing both the current event and the total
number of events (e.g., 59/59). The history feature records
all the interactions that investigators have with entities as
events, e.g., “create information element”, “resize compos-
ite”, “move information element”, and so on. Each event is
given a time stamp and added to the sequential history.
Prediction support includes covert network structure
and missing links prediction algorithms [5,29]. Exam-
ples of social network analysis support are centrality
measures such as degree, closeness, and betweenness [30].
An example of two centrality measures running simul-
taneously can be seen in Figure 2 (right). A structural
parser is used to select the algorithms that the investigator
wants to run, if they should run sequentially or simulta-
neously, the order in which they should run, and how to
output the results of algorithms. Customized combina-
tions of different algorithms can be created for frequent
use. For example, we developed a custom node removal
algorithm which can be used by criminal network inves-
tigators to ask ‘what-if ’ questions about the secondary
effects of removing a key individual from a criminal
network [25].
To evaluate the prediction algorithms, we developed
three measures of performance and used two different
data sets (see ‘Evaluation’). One of these data sets is a
network of al-Qaeda individuals who were an active part
of the organization up to the beginning of 2003. A miss-
ing links prediction on a sampled version of 20 individuals
from the al-Qaeda network is shown in Figure 4. The
investigator can decide whether to append the predictions
to the network or simply discard them.
Creating hypotheses is facilitated by the issue-based
argumentation view shown in Figure 5. Criminal network
investigators use factual evidence or inferential judgments
to reason about the issues they come across in their work.
Inferential judgments typically require detailed reasoning
involving several positions and even more ‘pro’ and ‘con’
arguments, while fact-based reasoning typically is done
Petersen and Wiil Security Informatics 2013, 2:10 Page 6 of 13
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/2/1/10
Figure 4 The result of a missing links prediction on a sampled version of 20 al-Qaeda individuals. Blue lines are previously known links.
Green dashed lines are predicted links that were ultimately shown to be false. The thick black line is a predicted link that was true.
by creating relations between pieces of evidence (see the
person information element ‘Daniel Pearl’ in Figure 2).
Hypothesis reasoning can be attached to any entity.
A small hexagon icon with the text ‘IPA’ is used
to show that reasoning is attached, and clicking the
icon opens the issue-based argumentation shown in
Figure 5. Reasoning can be used for several purposes:
(1) to capture and visualize disagreement in an anal-
ysis situation, ensuring that all positions and argu-
ments are heard; (2) to reason convincingly during
storytelling (e.g., a senior police officer is creating a
briefing based on a recently concluded investigation);
Figure 5 Issue-based argumentation view from the investigation of a kidnapping in Pakistan. The tool bar has buttons for creating issues (I),
positions (P), arguments (A), and relations between them.
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and (3) to create and explore (competing) hypotheses.
According to the IBISb model [31], we have adopted
the following predefined relations: is-suggested-by (←),
responds-to (→), supports (+), objects-to (−), questions
(?), and generalizes or specializes (©). The relation direc-
tion can be both ways in all cases. These predefined rela-
tions aid the criminal network investigators in controlling
the mapping of their dialogue about issues, positions, and
arguments.
Decision-making is currently only supported in the
issue-based argumentation view. A “decision” includes
a position, the issue it responds to, and associated
arguments.
Dissemination support
A history editor is implemented in CrimeFighter Investi-
gator to support Storytelling. The granularity of system
level history events is often too fine for telling a story.
The history editor allows the investigators to group his-
tory events that are relevant for the story individually,
but when grouped together they explain one important
step of the investigation. The investigators can delete
events (e.g., if an entity was created by mistake and
then deleted), annotate events or groups of events if they
feel that the system-generated description is not suffi-
cient, and move events up and down in order to match
a time line of real events (e.g., people join a group at a
different time from the investigation finding their group
membership).
Report generation is available at all stages of a crim-
inal network investigation. All CrimeFighter Investiga-
tor features implement a report interface that facilitates
the addition or removal of individual report elements.
The order in which elements are added to the report
is also dynamic. This makes it easier to create reports
targeting specific usages. For example, after a predic-
tion is made, reports with or without detailed calcula-
tions can be retrieved using the algorithm view (Figure 2,
right).
Evaluation
Current criminal network investigation tools aiming to
integrate synthesis and sense-making utilize a variety of
technologies. Therefore various approaches to evaluation
are required. We apply three different evaluation meth-
ods. The results of two of these methods are shown in
Table 1 and Table 2.
We compared the capabilities of CrimeFighter Inves-
tigator with other prominent commercial and research
tools for criminal network investigation. In the future,
we plan to involve more researchers and end-users in
such comparisons. We are currently designing structured
usability experiments following [32,33] for evaluation of
specific CrimeFighter Investigator features. For now, we
present usability feedback gathered from semi-structured
interviews with a number of end-users from various
criminal network investigation domains. Finally, a sense-
making task has been evaluated by developing and testing
measures of performance relevant for criminal network
investigators.
Capability comparisons
In this section, various tools that support criminal
network investigation are compared with CrimeFighter
Investigator. The chosen tools include both prominent
commercial tools and research prototypes, so that both
current and imminent future state-of-the-art is consid-
ered. The following three commercial tools have been
selected:
 i2 Analyst’s Notebook 8.5 supports a large set of
analysis and visualization capabilities support
analysts in quickly turning large sets of disparate
information into high-quality and actionable
intelligence to prevent crime and terrorism [19].
 Palantir Government 3.0 is a platform for
information analysis designed for environments
where the fragments of data which an analyst
combines to tell the larger story, are spread across a
vast set of starting material. Palantir is currently used
in various domains such as intelligence, defense, and
cyber security [20].
 Xanalys Link Explorer 6.0 (previously Watson [1])
allows investigators to apply powerful query and
analysis techniques to their data, presenting the
answers in a range of visualizations such as link
charts, time lines, maps, and reports [24].
Also, three research prototype tools have been selected
for the comparison:
 Aruvi is a prototype implementation of an
information visualization framework that supports
the analytical reasoning process [22].
 Sandbox is a flexible and expressive thinking
environment that supports both ad-hoc and formal
analytical tasks [23].
 POLESTAR (POLicy Explanation using STories and
ARguments) is an integrated suite of knowledge
management and collaboration tools for intelligence
analysts [21].
The evaluation and comparison of the selected tools
was made separately for each of the tasks listed in the
section ‘Criminal network investi- gation’. A thorough
examination of each tool has been made by the authors
based on the available research literature, books, manuals,
and other publicly available information. The results can
be seen in Table 1.
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Table 1 Overview of tool capability comparison based on support of criminal network investigationprocesses and tasks
AN 8.5* PG 3.0* XLE 6.0* Aruvi Sandbox POLESTAR CFI*
Aquisition 3 4 4 2 2 3 2
Acquisition methods       
Dynamic attributes       
Attribute mapping       
Synthesis 2 3 2 1 3 2 4
Entities       
Associations       
Re-structuring       
Grouping       
Collapsing and expanding       
Brainstorming       
Information types       
Emerging attributes       
Sense-making 1 3 1 2 2 2 4
Retracing the steps       
Creating hypotheses       
Adaptive modeling       
Prediction       
Alias detection       
Exploring perspectives       
Decision-making       
Social network analysis       
Dissemination 3 4 2 3 2 1 4
Storytelling       
Report generation       
*Tool abbreviations (AN: NB! Analyst’s Notebook, PG: Palantir Government, XLE: Xanalys Link Explorer, CFI: CrimeFighter Investigator). Investigative processes
(0: no support, 1: fragmentary support, 5: full support). Investigative tasks (: supported,: partially supported,: not supported).
Each tool is rated against each task in the list. A
judgment has been made whether the tool provides full
support, partial support, or no support for the task.
This is indicated by different icons in the table. Based
on the support for individual tasks, each tool has been
given a score for each process based on a judgment
of the number of tasks they support. This score is
either 0 (no support), 1 (fragmentary support), 2-4 (par-
tial support), or 5 (full support). Fragmentary support
means that the core task is in theory supported by
the tool through the combination of various features,
but it is found to be too time-consuming to be really
useful.
CrimeFighter Investigator scores well on three of the
four evaluated processes synthesis, sense-making, and
dissemination, but scores lower on aquisition. In fact,
CrimeFighter Investigator is found to provide more
comprehensive support of synthesis and sense-making
than any of the other tools, and the same high level of
support on dissemination.
Usability feedback
We have received usability feedback from a number
of people experienced in investigating criminal net-
works from various fields such as investigative journal-
ism, counterterrorism, and policing (see Table 3). For
the usability feedback interviews (individuals or groups)
we followed three steps: First, we gave a general intro-
duction to and demonstration of CrimeFighter Investi-
gator. Second, the criminal network investigators were
asked to describe their background and characteristics of
their ongoing network investigations. Third, we discussed
which CrimeFighter Investigator features would be useful
for the criminal network investigators in their work.
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Table 2 Overviewof end user feedback on the usability and relevance of supporting criminal network investigation
processes and taskswithin each end user’s investigationdomain
Investigative journalism Counterterrorism Policing Research and industry
Aquisition
Acquisition methods + + + +
Dynamic attributes + + + +
Attribute mapping + + + +
Synthesis
Entities + + + +
Associations + + + +
Re-structuring + + − +
Grouping − − − +
Collapsing and expanding − + − +
Brainstorming + − − +
Information types − + + +
Emerging attributes − + + +
Sense-making
Retracing the steps − + + −
Creating hypotheses + + + −
Adaptive modeling − + − −
Prediction + + − +
Alias detection − + − −
Exploring perspectives − + + −
Decision-making − − + −
Social network analysis + + + −
Dissemination
Storytelling + − + −
Report generation − − + −
To indicate the relevance of supporting the investigative task for end users from a particular investigation domain we use a plus sign (+). A minus sign (−) is used to
indicate when support is not a priority for the end users from that domain.
To exemplify our interview approach we provide
extracts of an interview held with historian and inves-
tigative journalist Alex Strick van Linschoten. The
example demonstrates the value of CrimeFighter Investi-
gator usability feedback for both development of future
features and evaluation of existing features. At the
Table 3 Investigators interviewed from secret and public
criminal network investigationorganizations
Secret Public Both
Investigative journalists 0 1 1
Intelligence analysts 1 5 6
Police officers 3 0 3
Research community 0 7 7
TOTAL 4 14 24
time of the interview, Alex is investigating the alleged
links between al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, and
he has observed several interesting network charac-
teristics (marked using a bold font in the paragraph
below).
Alex’s data set on the Afghan Taliban spans the time-
period 1970–2011. As of 2011 the data set had 500–
600 individuals, a network he claims to have more
or less memorized. The data set is based on inter-
views with Taliban members who were asked who they
fought with in the ’80s, their andiwaal groups (friend
groups normally formed by Afghans in their teenage
years) and other relations. Reports on Afghanistan by
the International Security Assistance Force ISAF also
contribute to the data set. 70 percent of the relations
in the network are based on rumors, which is indi-
cated using relation weights. When Alex interviews
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Taliban members he notes down attributes such as
‘name’, ‘date of birth’, ‘place of birth’, ‘tribe’, ‘ethnicity’
and ‘andiwaal group’. Alex uses Tinderbox [34], a spa-
tial hypertext tool, to record and structure the network
information he collects.
Alex processes the network information in a num-
ber of different ways and has in general many ideas
for how a tool such as CrimeFighter Investigator could
be applied to organize the information he retrieves.
Alex studies the evolution of the network through time
(a historical evolution perspective). He believes that
knowledge about an individual’s andiwaal group could
be used to predict who that person might be fighting
with in future operations. Alex is searching for differ-
ent patterns in the data set like for example changes in
age or gender.
Alex has encountered a number of problems for
which specialized tool support would be an advan-
tage, for instance, a social network analysis tool for
support of an actual time line (Tinderbox only sup-
ports snapshots of the network). At the time of inter-
view he was analyzing the network data to see if there
were any important observations that he might have
missed. Alex mentions that different layout function-
ality would be useful for this, e.g., laying out nodes
according to betweenness centrality. Finally, if Alex
exports information from Tinderbox [34] to import it
into Analyst’s Notebook [19] to create a special visual-
ization, it is not possible to get that visualization back
into Tinderbox. The interchange of information is not
facilitated both ways.
The feedback from potential end users of CrimeFighter
Investigator on the usability of the features presented to
them, has helped us prioritize those features to focus on
the most important ones. In general, the end users found
the features supported by CrimeFighter Investigator to be
applicable to their work, and in some cases our integration
of features was found to be more useful than existing tools
(such as i2 Analyst’s Notebook, see summary of evaluated
tools earlier in this section).
Measures of performance
Our measures of performance (MoPs) focus on the
internal structure, characteristics, and nature of crim-
inal network sense-making. We have developed three
measures to help us evaluate how CrimeFighter Inves-
tigator sense-making performs in terms of ‘information
volume’, ‘attribute completeness’, and ‘attribute accuracy’.
In the longer term, these MoPs will help us build a
process that criminal network investigators can have
confidence in, when going before a decision maker in
their organization [35]. We need to make sure that our
algorithm-supported sense-making tasks can perform on
the criminal networks that investigators are dealing with
on a daily basis. More specifically, we want to evalu-
ate if the integration of synthesis and sense-making tasks
is feasible.
In this section, we test our support for one sense-making
task, prediction, by evaluating the predict missing links
algorithm. We use two criminal networks for our eval-
uation: November 17 and al-Qaeda. The data set of the
(believed defunct) Greek terrorist group November 17
(N17) was derived from open source reporting [36]. The
N17 group was a small close knit organization of 22 indi-
viduals with 63 links out of a potential 231 links. The
links of the dataset were obtained from open sources
and report some connection between two individuals at
some point in the past, but no specific weightings of
the links are given [29] (i.e., the link weights are all the
same).
The second dataset is the al-Qaeda network at the
beginning of 2003. All the network information was gath-
ered from public domain sources: ‘documents and tran-
scripts of legal proceedings involving global Salafi muja-
hedin and their organizations, government documents,
press and scholarly articles, and Internet articles’ [37]. We
have included acquaintance, friend, and post joining jihad
relations, but the algorithm does not differentiate between
them. Nuclear family, relatives, religious leader, and ties
not in sample links are excluded from our version of the
data set. The topology of all networks are presented in
Table 4.
We use sampled versions of the full networks for our
evaluations, created by removing either 50 or 25 percent
of the links in the network and then seeing what is left. The
number of nodes and links alone directly affect algorithm
performance in terms of speed. The number of attributes
that each node has does not impact the performance of
the predict missing links, since tests are run with four
attributes every time. We define the complexity of node
attributes as the average of valid enumerated values per
attribute. Link density is the ratio between the number
of links and the number of potential links and indicates
for example the connectivity and covertness of the given
network.
We logged three variables for each test. Time is the
seconds it takes to predict missing links. True positives
are predicted links that exist in the non-sampled ver-
sion of the data set. False positives are predicted links
that do not exist in the non-sampled version of the data
set. The predict missing links algorithm was customized
in the same way for each sampled data set before each
test as described in Table 5. The al-Qaeda attributes are
selected to match the number of enumerated values for
each November 17 attribute.
We evaluate the predict missing links algorithm against
all the data sets using the three measures of performance.
The results are listed in Table 6.
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Table 4 The November 17 and al-Qaeda datasets
al-Qaeda November 17
version→ full full id 1–20 full full
sampling→ 100% 25% 50% 100% 50%
Nodes 366 256 15 22 17
Attributes 17 17 17 11 11
Complexity* 9.53 9.53 9.53 2.09 2.09
Links 999 249 18 63 32
Link density 0.015 0.008 0.17 0.27 0.24
*Complexity indicates the average number of enumerated values (text strings) for each entity attribute.
Information volume
This measure of performance is based on the change in
processing time and true and false positive ratios when
the number of nodes and links increases across the three
sampled data sets.
We observe that the sampled al-Qaeda data set
increases the time required to process the prediction
significantly (as expected). However, in the worst case
the logged time is only 63 seconds and this value
does not raise any operational concerns for most crimi-
nal network investigations. We realize that the network
can be much larger, and expect the required time to
increase also for the tested data set if attributes with
more enumerated values were selected. But it is our
experience that for very large networks, criminal net-
work investigators will request predictions within sub-
groups mostly and not the whole network. And if
the network gets very large, then the investigators will
be prepared to wait longer for assistance from the
algorithm.
Attributeaccuracy
The predict missing links algorithm assumes that attribute
content (text string) is machine-recognizable, i.e., the con-
tent should be one of a list of predefined text strings
(e.g., role [LEADERSHIP, OPERATIONAL] or degree cen-
trality [HIGH, MIDDLE, LOW]). We have decreased the
attribute accuracy of the sampled data set by scrambling a
percentage of the attribute values.
Table 5 Algorithm setup for the November 17 and
al-Qaeda data sets
Data set → November 17 al-Qaeda
L Cutoff 2.5 2.5
Attribute 1 Role Children
Attribute 2 Faction Clump
Attribute 3 Resources Fate
Attribute 4 Degree centrality Degree centrality
Decreasing the accuracy of attribute content to sim-
ulate the data having reduced reliability clearly impacts
on the number of predicted links, but the ratio between
true and false positives does not change, indicating some
robustness of the predict missing links algorithm. The
time actually decreases together with the decreasing accu-
racy of attributes; a decrease in predicted links (due to
less attribute content matching up) can more easily be
processed by the algorithm. One interesting observation
here is that the ratio of true positives dropped signifi-
cantly for the N17 data set at 70% acurracy to 1 (from 5
at 90% and 9 at 100%). We expect this is caused by N17
having fewer attributes than the al-Qaeda data set, mak-
ing it more vulnerable to random scrambling of attribute
values.
Attribute completeness
End user requirements and usability feedback indicated a
need to support dynamic and emerging entity attributes,
since limited information is typically available about the
individuals in criminal networks. To simulate this, we
delete attribute values from the data sets and replace them
with empty values.
Like attribute accuracy the total number of pre-
dicted links decreases as the number of non-empty
attribute values increases but the ratios stay more
or less the same. We anticipated this similarity
between the accuracy and completeness MoPs as
CrimeFighter Investigator does currently not include
technology that could improve the attribute accu-
racy by correcting for example typographical spelling
errors.
We chose the predict missing links algorithm to eval-
uate our developed measures of performance, because
we found it promising for investigation of criminal net-
works of sizes equal to or smaller than the al-Qaeda data
set. It is our experience, that criminal network investi-
gators do not synthesize and apply sense-making algo-
rithms to networks significantly bigger than the al-Qaeda
data set [37].
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Conclusions
The CrimeFighter Investigator approach to target-centric
criminal network investigation has been developed based
on three types of analysis work:
 Exploring methods.We have explored analytical
practices, processes, and techniques related to
investigative journalism, counterterrorism and
policing.
 Studying related work.We have found inspiration
from existing tools supporting criminal network
investigation and from other relevant investigations.
 Evaluation.We have compared the capabilities of six
existing tools with the CrimeFighter Investigator. We
have collected feedback from various criminal
network investigation communities regarding which
CrimeFighter Investigator features are useful and
usable. Finally, we have developed three measures of
performance for prediction algorithms.
Together, this analysis work resulted in a list of tasks
that guided our development. Many of the tasks envi-
sioned are already now supported. The main contribu-
tions to useful integration of criminal network synthesis
and sense-making are:
Process model.We have developed a target-centric pro-
cess model for criminal network investigation, splitting
the responsibilities between investigators and tool,
empowering humans to make more informed decisions.
Task list. We have outlined and evolved criminal net-
work investigation tasks spanning acquisition, synthesis,
sense-making, and dissemination processes, helping us
understand how to integrate these tasks.
Tool.We have developed a tool that assists criminal net-
work investigators in target-model synthesis and sense-
making, to produce useful intelligence products for their
customers.
Evaluation.Our evaluation results from capability com-
parisons, usability feedback, and measures of perfor-
mance, indicate that we are on the right path to inte-
grate a broad range of criminal network synthesis and
sense-making tasks in one tool. We have observed that
existing tools typically focus on either synthesis or sense-
making tasks.
Together, this has resulted in a novel tool that combines
knowledge from various research domains (including
hypertext, knowledge management, software engineer-
ing, and criminal network analysis) to address criminal
network investigation challenges, processes, and tasks.
As part of our near term future work, we will pro-
vide support for the remaining tasks related to synthe-
sis, sense-making, and dissemination. We then plan to
thoroughly test the tool in cooperation with experienced
investigators. In the longer term, we plan to include
Table 6 Measures of performance for the predictmissing links algorithm
Data set Version Sampling Time (s) TP*# TP% FP*# FP%
Full data set
100%
November 17 (full) (50%) 0.219 9 42.9 12 57.1
al-Qaeda (id 1–20) (50%) 0.078 7 35.0 13 65.0
al-Qaeda (full) (25%) 63.093 288 4.9 5547 95.1
Attribute accuracy
90%
November 17 (full) (50%) 0.235 5 35.7 9 64.3
al-Qaeda (id 1–20) (50%) 0.79 6 46.2 7 53.8
al-Qaeda (full) (25%) 37.562 165 5.1 3052 94.9
70%
November 17 (full) (50%) 0.124 1 16.7 5 83.3
al-Qaeda (id 1–20) (50%) 0.62 5 45.5 6 54.5
al-Qaeda (full) (25%) 24.656 167 5.0 3171 95.0
Attribute completeness
90%
November 17 (full) (50%) 0.282 5 45.5 6 54.5
al-Qaeda (id 1–20) (50%) 0.094 7 41.2 10 58.8
al-Qaeda (full) (25%) 41.344 197 4.8 3939 95.2
70%
November 17 (full) (50%) 0.531 5 45.5 6 54.5
al-Qaeda (id 1–20) (50%) 0.079 5 41.7 7 58.3
al-Qaeda (full) (25%) 24.328 146 4.4 3167 95.6
*TP = true positives, FP = false positives.
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support for cooperation beyond the shared information
space and provide integration with the CrimeFighter
Explorer tool for better acquisition support.
Endnotes
a The kidnapping of Daniel Pearl [9,28], the intelligence
used for the United States case against Iraq concerning
their (alleged) wmd programme [6,11], and the links
between Operation Crevice and the 7/7 bombings in
United Kingdom [3,4].
b Issue Based Information Systems.
Competing interests
Both authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
RRP carried out the analysis, design, and implementation of support for
criminal network investigation processes and tasks in CrimeFighter
Investigator. RRP also carried out the analysis that formed the basis of
evaluations, designed the experiments for each of the three evaluation
methods, and subsequently carried out these experiments. UKW supervised
the whole process. In collaboration, UKW and RRP synthesed the capability
comparison table and developed the target-centric model for criminal
network investigation. Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
This work is based on previous publications by the authors in hypertext and
security informatics conference proceedings [13,14,25].
Received: 15 November 2011 Accepted: 22 March 2013
Published: 1 May 2013
References
1. MK Sparrow, The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence:
An assessment of the prospects. Soc. Netw. 13, 251–274 (1991)
2. UK Wiil, N Memon, J Gniadek, CrimeFighter: A toolbox for
counterterrorism. Lect. Notes Commun. Comput Inf. Sci. (Knowl. Discov.,
Knowl. Eng, Knowl. Manage). 128, 337–350 (2011)
3. SecurityCommittee Intelligence and, Could 7/7 have been Prevented?
Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, (UK,
2009)
4. G Woo, inMathematical Methods in Counterterrorism, ed. by N Memon, T
Farley, JD Hicks, and DL Rosenorn. Intelligence constraints on terrorist
network plots (Springer Wien, 2009), pp. 205–214
5. CJ Rhodes, P Jones, Inferring missing links in partially observed social
networks. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 60(10), 1373–1383 (2009)
6. B Drogin, Curveball. (Ebury Press, 2008)
7. National commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States, The 9/11,
Commission Report (Executive Summary) (USA, 2004). http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf
8. MR Kebbell, DA Muller, K Martin, Understanding and managing bias
Dealing Uncertainties Policing Serious Crime. (Australian National
University, Canberra, 2010), pp. 87–97
9. BH Levy,Who Killed Daniel Pearl?. (Melville House Publishing, Brooklyn,
2003)
10. C Atzenbeck, DL Hicks, N Memon, Supporting reasoning and
communication for intelligence officers. Int. J. Netw. 8(1/2), 15–36 (2011).
Virtual Organisations
11. T Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. (Anchor Books, New York,
2008)
12. R Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach. (CQ Press,
California, 2007)
13. RP Petersen, UK Wiil, in Proceedings of the 22nd ACMConference on
Hypertext. Hypertext structures for investigative teams (ACM Press New
York, 2011), pp. 123–132
14. RR Petersen, UK Wiil, in Proceedings of European Intelligence and Security
Informatics Conference. CrimeFighter Investigator: a novel tool for criminal
network investigation (IEEE, 2011), pp. 360–365
15. R Adderly, P Musgrove, Police crime recording and investigation systems
- A user’s view. Int. J. Police Strateg. Manage. 24, 100–114 (2001)
16. RV Badalamente, FL Greitzer, in Proceedings of International Conference on
Intelligence Analysis. Top ten needs for intelligence analysis tool
development, (2005)
17. EA Bier, SK Card, JW Bodnar, Principles and tools for collaborative
entity-based intelligence analysis. IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. 16(2),
178–191 (2010)
18. G Dean, P Gottschalk, Knowledge Management in Policing and Law
Enforcement. (Oxford University Press, 2007)
19. i2, Analyst’s Notebook (2011). http://www.i2group.com/
20. Palantir Government (2011). http://www.palantirtech.com/government
21. NJ Pioch, JO Everett, in Proceedings of the International Conference on
Information and Knowledge Management. POLESTAR: collaborative
knowledge management and sensemaking tools for intelligence analysts
(ACM Press New York, 2006), pp. 513–521
22. YB Shrinivasan, JJ Wijk, in Proceedings of the 26th Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems. Supporting the analytical reasoning
process in information visualization (ACM Press New York, 2008)
23. W Wright, D Schroh, P Proulx, A Skaburskis, B Cort, in Proceedings of the
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. The Sandbox for
analysis: concepts and methods (ACM Press, 2006), pp. 801–810
24. Xanalys (2011). http://www.xanalys.com/
25. RR Petersen, CJ Rhodes, UK Wiil, in Proceedings of European Intelligence
and Security Informatics Conference. Node removal in criminal networks
(IEEE Computer Society Washington, 2011), pp. 360–365
26. RR Petersen, UK Wiil, in Handbook of Computational Approaches to
Counterterrorism, ed. by Subrahmanian. V S. CrimeFighter Investigator:
criminal network sense-making (Springer New York, 2013), pp. 323–359
27. RR Petersen, in Criminal Network Investigation: Processes, Tools, and
Techniques (University of Southern Denmark, 2012). Ph.D. dissertation
28. M Pearl, AMighty Heart. (Virago Press, 2004)
29. CJ Rhodes, CMJ Keefe, Social network topology: a Bayesian approach. J.
Oper. Res. Soc. 58(12), 1605–1611 (2007)
30. S Wasserman, K Faust, in Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 1994)
31. J Conklin, ML Begeman, gIBIS: a hypertext tool for exploratory policy
discussion. ACM Trans Inf Syst. 6(4), 303–331 (1988)
32. A Field, G Hole. How to Design and Report Experiments (Sage
Publications Ltd London, 2003)
33. C Atzenbeck. WildDocs - Investigating Construction of Metaphors in
Office Work (Aalborg University, 2006). PhD thesis
34. M Bernstein, The Tinderbox Way. (Eastgate Systems, Watertown, 2006)
35. JP Stenbit, IL Wells, DS Alberts, NATO code of best practice for C2
assessment, [Chapter 5: Measures of Merit]. (CCRP, Washington, 2002)
36. C Irwin, C Roberts, N Mee, in Defence Science and Technology Laboratory.
Counter Terrorism Overseas, (2002). Dstl/CD053271/1.1 UK
37. M Sageman. Understanding Terrorist Networks (University of
Pennsylvania Press (PENN) Philadelphia, Pensylvania, 2004)
doi:10.1186/2190-8532-2-10
Cite this article as: Petersen and Wiil: CrimeFighter Investigator: Integrat-
ing synthesis and sense-making for criminal network investigation. Security
Informatics 2013 2:10.
